The classification statement of NOFORN (meaning “no foreign nationals “) is applied to any information that may not be released to any non-U.S. citizen.

The classified documents, as released in the recent NYT/White House/Pentagon storyline, carried the NOFORN designation.  That means the source documents describing U.S. geopolitical and intelligence strategies were contained inside U.S. compartmented intelligence silos, prior to their surfacing in the social media platforms as discussed. Keep this in mind.  WATCH:

First, the story surfaces from the New York Times.  What does that tell us?  It tells us the stakeholders in a background narrative surrounding the issue as constructed are domestic intelligence interests.  If there was a State Dept stakeholder interest, the story would have been presented by CNN.  If there was a U.S. foreign intelligence operation stakeholder interest, the story would have surfaced in the Washington Post.

The story surfaces in the New York Times indicating a U.S. domestic intelligence interest, and the story is sourced directly to the White House via “senior Biden administration officials.”  What does that mean?  It means the narrative that flows from the story has a direction to shape opinion from the perspective of U.S. government domestic public relations.  It means the narrative is intended to sway a domestic audience with a motive toward something else.

Secondly, and in full alignment with the first point, the centerpiece of the story is focused on a leak that surfaces in “social media.”  This fits perfectly with the domestic intelligence stakeholders (DHS, National Security Council, etc).   We know domestic intelligence operates in the backbone of social media platforms.  An example is DHS and domestic Intelligence Community (IC) work as outlined in the Twitter files.

Put them together; a domestic IC product surfaced (being called leaked) into social media platforms containing portals controlled by domestic IC.

The domestic IC then report on the leaks to the outlet used by the domestic IC.   See how these fit?

If you follow the bouncing ball, what you immediately suspect is the domestic IC planted the ‘classified information’ in the platforms they can access, then turn around and report on the leak of the classified information to media they use for domestic narrative engineering.

♦ Motive – But why would the IC plant classified information, then turn around and report on the classified information they planted?  This is where we remind ourselves how the motives work, against a bigger picture.

The leak (planted information) and then the telling of the leak (NYT story) creates an opportunity for the domestic IC to frame a Russian dis/mis/mal-information narrative.

But why would the IC want to immediately stir up a misinformation or disinformation narrative against Russia?

♦ Answer: Just before the leak/story construct.  Two Russian gremlins, perhaps state sponsored, or perhaps just state aligned, tricked former French President Francois Hollande into admitting the U.S. government and western alliance were behind all of the events in Ukraine after 2014, with the expressed intention to construct a proxy war against Russia using Ukraine.

Russian Pranksters Vovan and Lexus, posing as former Ukraine President Petro Poroshenko, got French ex-President Francois Hollande to admit the Minsk Accords were a NATO ruse to militarize Ukraine, and Western nations overthrew Ukraine’s democratically-elected government in 2014. (Full YouTube Conversation)

As noted by Gonzalo Lira, “François Hollande, former President of France, confirms that the 2014 coup d’etat in Ukraine was part of a long-term plan to have Ukraine fight a proxy war against Russia. The Americans have been preparing this war since the Obama administration—it is now confirmed beyond doubt.”

The admission by Hollande aligns with every element of the U.S. effort to use Russia as a bad guy, including the use of Russia against Donald J. Trump.  A proxy war against Russia was in the works going all the way back to the Euromaidan efforts, the color revolution in Ukraine, as constructed by the U.S. State Department, and facilitated by U.S. allies in Europe.

This is the most explosive dose of geopolitical sunlight in years, and obviously these statements by Hollande were a serious issue for the White House and U.S. Intelligence Community.   Hollande was tricked by two Russian pranksters into spilling the real story about Ukraine and U.S. involvement therein.

Now do you see the need?  The Hollande admission is an urgent problem.

Less than one news cycle later, the IC dropped the Ukraine counteroffensive strategy in the platforms the IC has access to (a purposeful leak).  Then the IC tells the story of the classified strategy leak to the New York Times and begins framing a Russian mis/disinformation campaign.   All issues, including the Hollande story, now fall under the same claims of Russian mis/disinformation.

As the narrative is pushed by the compliant media, all of the geopolitical stories are now filtered through the prism of Russian mis/disinformation.  Ergo, all of the potentially damaging information, even if accurate and true, is attributed to Russian misinformation operations and subsequently disregarded.

The leak of classified intelligence, and the attribution to Russian misinformation, is like a brushback pitch toward the heads of the media on the explosive Francois Hollande story.  It works.

That’s how the control agents operate.  Deflection and adverse information removal is what IC operations are intended to control.  This ‘leak’ looks like a successful IC operation.

Once you see the strings on the DC marionettes, you can never return to that moment in the performance when you did not see them.

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