Marilyn Mosby asserted in her probable cause statement the Medical Examiner conclusion that Freddie Gray’s “fatal injury” occurred “inside the Baltimore Police transport van”.  An assertion also evident today in a New York Times report:

[…]  The medical examiner has concluded that Mr. Gray’s fatal neck injury occurred in the van, according to a person with knowledge of the investigation (link)

Numerous national network broadcasts have focused on the transport van, including some networks doing re-enactments based on similar transport vans.  However, what each media outlet has missed, is the factual layout of the specific van used in the 4/12/15 event.
We recently re-focused attention on this aspect when it was noted the transport is actually a 3 compartment van, NOT a two compartment van that most of the media focuses upon.



This becomes a key issue when reconciling how much space Freddie Gray had to move around.
Compartment #1 (side door entry) is the smallest, and generally the first used compartment when transporting a prisoner.
Compartment #2 (rear door entry – right side) is the next largest compartment.  This is the compartment used to transport Freddie Gray.
Compartment #3 (rear door entry – left side) is the largest compartment within the transport.  Presumably this was the compartment used to transport the additional passenger from the pickup of Donta Allen.

What does this indicate?
There are several key takeaways from the specific location of Freddie Gray inside the transport van:
♦  First, with the revelation of the 3 compartment set up, the compartment housing Freddie Gray is 30 to 40% smaller than originally thought.
♦  Second, compartment #2 is the only compartment with no direct line of sight available from inside the cab of the transport.  Officer Goodson, charged with 2nd degree murder, was the driver.  Goodson would have been able to see inside compartment #1, and compartment #3 from the cab, if necessary.  However, Goodson could not see inside compartment #2, the location of Freddie Gray.
Presumably this is why compartment #2 houses a video camera with a monitor in the cab. The design is not a recording camera, but merely a monitor. However, again, as reported in numerous media, this video camera/monitor was broken and inoperable on 4/12/15 during the events in question.
Absent a video monitor, the only way to see inside compartment #2 is to actually open the rear door.
♦  Third, compartment #2 -as a consequence of similar reasoning, you cannot see it- is also the compartment with the least sound available to the driver or cab occupant.
Compartment #2 has various barriers between the cab and the space itself, and because compartment #2 is the furthest away from the driver, it would be the compartment hardest to hear sound from.  Any noises stemming from inside compartment #2 would be less likely heard by the driver, Officer Goodson.

Caesar Goodson – William Porter – Alicia White

How these facts impact the case against Goodson, Porter and White are undetermined.  However, these empirical facts remain as considerations for all forward analysis.  Especially when you consider:

The medical examiner has concluded that Mr. Gray’s fatal neck injury occurred in the van, according to a person with knowledge of the investigation”. (link)

The various media re-enactments are not using the correct layout for their comparisons.

Now, lets look at Marilyn Mosby’s “Probable Cause Statement” again.

From Marilyn Mosby statement of probable cause (transcript):

[…]  Lt. [Brian] Rice Officer [Garrett] Miller and Officer [Edward] Nero loaded Mr. Gray into the wagon and at no point was he secured by a seatbelt while in the wagon contrary to a BPD general order.

Lt. Rice then directed the BPD wagon to stop at Baker Street.

At Baker Street, Lt. Rice, Officer Nero and Officer Miller removed Mr. Gray from the wagon, placed flexi-cuffs on his wrists, placed leg shackles on his ankles and completed required paperwork.

Officer Miller, Officer Nero and Lt. Rice then loaded Mr. Gray back into the wagon, placing him on his stomach, head first onto the floor of the wagon. Once again Mr. Gray was not secured by a seatbelt in the wagon contrary to a BPD general order.

Lt. Rice then directed Officer Goodson to transport Mr. Gray to the Central Booking & Intake Facility.

Following transport from Baker Street, Mr. Gray suffered a severe and critical neck injury as a result of being handcuffed, shackled by his feet and unrestrained inside of the BPD wagon.

From Baker Street, Officer Goodson proceeded to the vicinity of Mosher Street and Fremont Avenue where he subsequently parked the wagon and proceeded to the back of the wagon to observe Mr. Gray.

Despite stopping for the purpose of checking on Mr. Gray’s condition, at no point did he seek nor did he render any medical assistance for Mr. Gray.

Officer Goodson returned to his driver’s seat and proceed toward the Central Booking & Intake facility with Mr. Gray still unsecured by a seatbelt contrary to a BPD general order.

Several blocks later, Officer Goodson called into dispatch that he needed to check on the status of his prisoner and requested additional units at Dolphin Street and Druid Hill Avenue.

Officer William Porter arrived on the scene at Dolphin Street and Druid HIll Avenue.

Both Officer Goodson and porter proceeded to the back of the wagon to check on the status of Mr. Gray’s condition. Mr. Gray at that time requested help and indicated that he could not breathe. Officer Porter asked Mr. Gray if he needed a medic at which time Mr. Gray indicated at least twice that he was in need of a medic.

Officer Porter then physically assisted Mr. Gray from the floor of the van to the bench however despite Mr. Gray’s appeal for a medic, both officers assessed Mr. Gray’s condition and at no point did either of them restrain Mr. Gray per BPD general order nor did they render or request medical assistance.

While discussing the transportation of Mr. Gray for medical attention, a request for additional units was made for an arrest at the 1600 West North Avenue. [Donta Allen] 

{*SNIP* If Porter and Goodson did not “render or request medical assistance“, then why does Mosby’s own statement, claim in the very next sentence, that Porter and Goodson were discussing “the transportation of Mr. Gray for medical attention”..?}

Officer Porter left the scene of Druid Hill Avenue to assist in the arrest of another prisoner [Donta Allen] at North Avenue.

Despite Mr. Gray’s obvious and recognized need for medical assistance, Officer Goodson in a grossly negligent manner chose to respond to the 1600 block of West North Avenue with Mr. Gray still unsecured by a seatbelt in the wagon without rendering to or summoning medical assistance for Mr. Gray.

Officer Goodson arrived at North Avenue to transport the individual arrested [Donta Allen] at the location of North Avenue and Pennsylvania Avenue at which time he was again met by Officer Nero, Miller and Porter. Once the wagon arrived, Officer Goodson walked to the back of the wagon and again opened the doors to the wagon to make observations of Mr. Gray.

Sgt. Alicia White, Officer Porter and Officer Goodson observed Mr. Gray unresponsive on the floor of the wagon.

Sgt. White who is responsible for investigating two citizen complaints pertaining to Mr. Gray’s illegal arrest spoke to the back of Mr. Gray’s head. When he did not respond, she did nothing further despite the fact that she was advised that he needed a medic. She made no effort to look or assess or determine his condition.

Despite Mr. Gray’s seriously deteriorating medical condition, *no medical assistance was rendered or summoned for Mr. Gray at that time by any officer. 

[*This is factually disputed when you listen to the radio transmissions of EMS request] 

After completing the North Avenue arrest and loading the additional prisoner into the opposite side of the wagon containing Mr. Gray, Officer Goodson then proceeded to the Western District Station where contrary to the BPD general order, he again failed to restrain Mr. Gray in the wagon for at least the fifth time.

At the Western District Police Station the defendant arrested at North Avenue [Donta Allen] was unloaded, escorted and secured inside of the police station prior to attending to Mr. Gray.  (continue reading affidavit transcript)

Notice how State Attorney Marilyn Mosby never reconciles the change of destination.
The transport vehicle originally headed to “Central Booking”, after physical check #1 (stop #2) the van was still headed toward “Central Booking”.  Physical check #2 (stop #3), then the call to West North Avenue (stop #4), then the van drives directly to Western District Station.
The call for EMS service was between the time Porter and Goodson were discussing medical aid (stop #3), and the call to pickup Donta Allen (stop #4).  If the officers were not concerned about Freddie Gray the end destination would have been “Central Booking”, the original destination.
The destination was changed because they did, in actuality, show concern.
Pickup Freddie Gray – Goodson Driving:

Stop #1, restraints and paperwork (Baker Street – Rice, Nero and Miller)

Stop #2, check on Freddie (Mosher Street and Fremont Avenue – Goodson alone)

Stop #3, check on Freddie, Goodson calls dispatch (Dolphin Street and Druid Hill Avenue – joined by Officer Porter)

Stop #4, pick up Donta Allen, call EMS (North Ave, Nero, Miller, Porter, then White meet Goodson)

If Goodson, Porter and White did not request EMS service at 1600 North Ave, specifically for Freddie Gray, Goodson would have continued driving to Central Booking.  The radio dispatch reflects they requested EMS, waited a few minutes, then drove straight to Western District HQ Station where EMS services were also located.
If you look specifically at the assets according to the Baltimore Fire/EMS Website, you will see that Unit 3 is the fire chiefs car, not an ambulance or EMS unit; all from Third Battalion:
Third Battalion

• •Engine Company 8, Truck Company 10, Medic 15, Battalion Chief 3, Decon 1
• •Engine Company 14
• •Engine Company 30, Truck Company 8, Medic 12
• •Charles R. Thomas Fire Station- Engine Company 36, Critical 63
• •Squad 47
• •Engine Company 53
• •Engine Company 55, Truck Company 23, Critical Alert 43, Peak 43

It is also important to note that all of these emergency units (Fire Engine 8, EMS 15 (Medic 15 above) and Unit 3 (chief 3 above) are directly from 1503 W. LaFayette Avenue. This is RIGHT NEXT DOOR to the Western District HQ where the eventual Freddie Gray transport arrived.