This writing is awkward but necessary.
Dear Mr. West,
It is an unknown variable how much of the case background you were technically aware of prior to your entry into this case. It is also an unknown variable as to the nature of your relationship with Mark O’Mara, and whether it is in fact more than professional? However, it is well-known to interested observers that you are the primary researcher/investigator of the defense.
Your partner sucks.
Not only is he professionally compromised, known by many within the courthouse circuit to be a fibber and ‘stretcher of truth’, and concerned more about his selfish ego than the protection of his client, your client, – but he is also smarmy and truth adverse.
Being truth adverse might be a keen professional benefit for lawyered types when representing guilty folks, or those who might be guilty; But it’s a horrid professional trait when defending the innocent because truth is supposed to be on your side.
So what does that mean?
Quite simply, it means that you, Don West, are the only hope that George Zimmerman has.
With that in mind, and considering the presentation before Judge Nelson on Friday 2/22/12 – You really dropped the ball regarding the motion to depose Benjamin Crump.
You, and we, know that witness #8 is a fraud and a guise – with a specific narrative created by Benjamin Crump. We, and you, also know the key to deconstructing that fraudulent narrative is the disinfecting sunlight of truth through discovery.
a) have expected it, and b) have had a pre-plan to use such a ruling to your advantage.
Remind the court that by offering Benjamin Crump the protections codified within statute and prior case referenced conditions -saved only for prosecuting counsel- she is simultaneously then attaching all of his behaviors, conduct, and actions to the State Prosecutorial team.
In essence, if Nelson is going to protect Crump “as if” he is the state prosecutor, then you should present your counter points as if the “state” is now responsible for the behavior of Crump:
Your honor, if you are going to use, and afford, referenced case-law to protect the non-party Crump from deposition, thereby assigning him a new status of central party or conjoined counsel with the state, it is prudent to ask the State Prosecutor Mr. Bernie De La Rionda if he accepts such distinctions?
Secondly, and as a consequence of such acceptance, if such distinctions are now accepted by the State, will the state clarify for the record why they specifically and intentionally have erroneously misled the court -and the accused- with regard to the identity of Witness #8.
Mr. Crump, and now by your honor’s extension, ‘The State’, have presented and portrayed the witness to be a “minor child” of 16-years-age on March 19th 2012. Simultaneously, the same State is now presenting the identity of this witness to be 19 years old on February 22nd of 2013 – A seemingly irreconcilable difference.
Previously, Mr. Crump presented through his counsel, Mr. Blackwell, an affidavit to the court noting that at the time of initial discovery for witness #8 (March 19th 2012) she was a minor, and further she was never asked, nor voluntarily gave her last name.
Additionally, not only was Witness #8 not asked her name, but she was not asked her address or other such identifying characteristics.
Lastly, according to the same sworn affidavit presented to the court, Mr. Crump, who is now by your judicial interpretation -a member of the state prosecutorial team- has claimed to have had no further contact with the Witness after March 19th.
If Mr. Crump never asked for her name, and the witness was identified by her age of 16, and he had no further contact with her after their March 19th conversation, then how can the State assert it was the same witness who was later interviewed on April 2nd and physically presented herself to be 18-years-of age?
If Mr. Crump is now a representative of the State, and the State is to be taken at their word to be truthful and honest, then how can this be reconciled?
Would this not represent a fair question that can only be answered by the same person or persons who presented her, through her sworn affidavit, to this court -which subsequently led to the arrest of my client?
Is the court now affirming that it is permissible for the “key” and “primary” state’s witness to be hidden or sheltered from questioning? And how can the State, or by extension this court, affirm to the accused that the identity of the person they will provide for deposition be the same person either party, Mr. Crump or Mr. De La Rionda have interviewed?
The accused is being restricted from any identifying “any” characteristics of Witness #8 such as her address, despite the fact that the state has presented differing and actual physical accounts of this same witness.
By granting Mr. Crump the protections of opposing counsel from deposition, the court is now restricting the accused from knowing, with certainty, the identity of his accuser – and simultaneously putting a road block in the quest for truth and justice by allowing the State to avoid having to reconcile the differing accounts of her personage.
Is this your honor’s intent?